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Introduction
The New-Keynesian Taylor-Rule (NK, henceforth) approach to monetary economics provides the current standard model of in ‡ation determination. By linking interest rate decisions directly to in ‡ation and economic activity, Taylor Rules o¤ered a convenient tool for studying monetary policy while abstracting from a detailed analysis of the demand and supply of money. 1 This change in the standard analytics is an understandable re ‡ection of how most central banks now make monetary policy: by setting a short-term nominal interest rate, with little if any explicit role for money (see Friedman, 2003) . 2 Furthermore, econometric evidence supporting the stabilization properties of this rule (see Taylor, 1999 ) and its usefulness for understanding historical monetary policy (see Clarida, Gali, and Gertler, 2000) explains its popularity. 3 While the NK approach has been remarkably successful, there are reasons to be uneasy about the lack of modelling of money markets. For example, Cochrane (2007a) argues that the way standard "New Keynesian"models work to discipline in ‡ation is in fact incredible:
In e¤ect, the Fed threatens to raise in ‡ation and interest rates without limit should in ‡ation deviate from the stable path. That is, the Fed threatens hyperin ‡ation or de ‡ation, unless 1 Woodford (2008) describes a class of New-Keynesian models and draws attention to the fact that interest rates transmit directly to intertemporal spending decisions and that monetary policy need not be framed in terms of monetary aggregates. For an account of the origins of the Taylor Rule in early work by Henderson and McKibbin (1993) , see Minford (2008) . 2 There are exceptions of course. For example, the European Central Bank (ECB) continues to assign a prominent role to money in its monetary policy strategy. In what the ECB calls its "two-pillar strategy,"one pillar is "economic analysis,"which "assesses the short-to-medium-term determinants of price developments." In addition, a second pillar, "monetary analysis," assesses the medium-to long-term outlook for in ‡ation, exploiting the long-run link between money and prices. 3 These developments have greatly in ‡uenced monetary policy research and teaching. This allowed the development of simpler models (see the survey in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler, 1999) and the replacement of the "LM curve" with a Taylor Rule in textbook treatments of the Hicksian IS-LM apparatus (see Taylor (2000) and Romer (2000) ).
3 in ‡ation jumps to one particular value on each date. This is true: if in ‡ation takes o¤ along a bubble path in this model what is there to stop it? The New Keynesian answer seems to be: just the horrifying thought that this might happen! Essentially, the government threatens to 'blow up the (monetary) world'to use Cochrane's phrase should any but one equilibrium occur. Because people believe this threat, in ‡ation goes to this unique path. But would people really avoid deviant paths fearing this nuclear option? And would they believe that the Fed would stick with such a rule under such circumstances?
One problem is that these threats are not credible. The reason is that, once in ‡ation or de ‡ation happens, carrying through on the threat is a disastrous policy. As a result self-destructive threats are less likely to be carried out ex-post, and thus less likely to be believed ex-ante. A second problem with these threats is that even if they were credible and did actually happen, there seems to be nothing to stop people following the implied paths.
While undesirable from a social viewpoint, they do not appear to be impossible. Thus no transversality conditions on real variables appear to be violated for reasonable versions of NK models. What this shows is that the Taylor Rule is an incomplete description of monetary policy, at least within a NK model; it cannot account for determinate in ‡ation before 1980, and after 1980 it lacks a clear mechanism for ruling out unstable paths (see Cochrane, 2007b) .
One has to assume that the authorities have some additional tool in their locker to rule out unstable paths.
Our proposal is in e¤ect that the NK model should be formulated with a money demand and money supply function. It should also embody a terminal condition for money supply behaviour. If an unstable path occurred the central bank would switch to a money supply rule explicitly designed to stop it via say a terminal condition. This would be therefore a 4 threat or trigger strategy complementing the Taylor Rule -only to be invoked if in ‡ation misbehaved. Of course if the strategy is credible it would never be observed and you would just get the Taylor Rule. Thus we achieve a determinate solution without appealing to the notion that the unstable paths are ruled out by an extreme threat to wreck the monetary economy 4 ; and also answer the criticisms levelled at the Taylor Rule that it has no credible mechanism for ruling out bubbles -we do this via our threat strategy. However it does imply that money cannot be avoided in the NK set-up, contrary for example to Woodford (2008) .
There has to be a money supply rule operating in emergency at least. 
where i t =nominal interest rate, t =in ‡ation and r =constant real rate. The coe¢ cient > 0 measures how sensitive the central bank's interest rate target is to in ‡ation. We can 6 solve this model by substituting out the nominal interest rate, leaving only in ‡ation,
where we have a …rst order expectational di¤erence equation in t . The general solution for this …rst order di¤erence equation can be expressed as
Equation ( The NK answer is: just the dreadful thought that this might happen. This is because in this model the monetary authority is absolutely committed to raising interest rates more than one for one with in ‡ation, for all values of in ‡ation. For only one value of in ‡ation today will we fail to see in ‡ation that either explodes or, more generally, eventually leaves a local region. Ruling out non-local equilibria, NK modellers conclude that in ‡ation today jumps to the unique value that leads to a locally-bounded equilibrium path.
Determinacy in the three-equation model
Now let us consider a standard NK IS-LM model (for example, see Clarida et al., (1999) and
Woodford (2003)). For determinacy questions, we can work with a stripped-down model without constants or shocks.
where where y t = output, r t = real interest rate, i t = nominal interest rate, t = in ‡ation.
This representation can represent deviations from a speci…c equilibrium of a model with shocks (see Cochrane (2007b) . The …rst two equations derive from consumer …rst order conditions for consumption today vs. consumption tomorrow. 5 The …rst equation is a log- Woodford (2008) refers to models of this kind "neo-Wicksellian," to draw attention to the fundamental role in such models of a transmission mechanism in which interest rates a¤ect intertemporal spending decisions, so that monetary policy need not be speci…ed in terms of an implied path for the money supply, but the terminology "NewKeynesian" for such models has become commonplace, following Clarida et al. (1999) , among others. 8 intertemporally-optimizing …rms that set prices subject to costs. 6 The remaining equation required to close the system is a speci…cation of monetary policy. We might, for example, specify policy by a rule of the kind proposed by Taylor (1993) for the central bank's operating target for the short-term nominal interest rate,
Can Such a Model Explain the Rate of In ‡ation?
A …rst question about this model is whether such a model which has thus far made no reference to the economy's supply of money has any implication for the rate of in ‡ation.
Woodford (2008) argues that while a model like this does not determine the in ‡ation rate independently of monetary policy, it does determine the in ‡ation rate without any reference to money growth and without any need to specify additional relations beyond those listed above. He goes on to argue that there is nothing "conceptually incoherent"about a model of in ‡ation determination that involves no role whatsoever for measures of the money supply.
Using (2.4) to substitute for i t in (2.2), the model (2.1)-(2.3) can be written in the form, The eigenvalues of matrix A that is, 1 and 2 , are computed by setting det (A I) = 0.
This gives a second-order polynomial in : 
For the usual parameter values in NK models ( = 1, > 0, > 0 and > 1) the system guarantees both eigenvalues are greater than one. Thus the general solution for E t t+1 can be expressed as
How does the Fed plan to stabilise in ‡ation in this model? In this model, E t y t+i and E t t+i explode in any equilibrium other than y = 0, = 0. According to these New If this statement is believed, then it may be enough to convince the private sector that the in ‡ation and output will actually take on its neutral level."
Ruling out such non-local equilibria, the NK tradition concludes that output and in ‡a-tion are again determinate. According to Cochrane (2007a) , in e¤ect if current in ‡ation misbehaves the Fed threatens to implement such paths (hyperin ‡ation or hyperde ‡ation).
Thus the threat is to 'blow up the world'-and this threat is supposed to be so terrifying that private agents expect the stable path instead. No economic consideration rules out the explosive solutions. With > 1, the explosive solutions are legitimate solutions of the model, just as the multiple solutions are legitimate with < 1.
7
This interpretation of the ruling-out of unstable paths raises many questions. Consider what is being said. 1) if in ‡ation rises (falls), it will be forced into a hyperin ‡ation (hyperde ‡ation) by the Fed. 2) if in ‡ation remains on target, then the Fed will maintain it at that target. So we need to establish how this enables private agents to choose the stable path. Clearly they will prefer the stable path; but how can they be sure it will happen, given 7 Proposition 3 If the number of eigenvalues outside the unit circle is less than the number of nonpredetermined variables, there is an in…nity of stable solutions. Blanchard and Kahn (1980) Proposition 4 Let 1 , 2 lie in the complex plane, then: the i 's (i = 1, 2) are one inside and one outside the unit circle if and only if the following condition is satis…ed:
For the usual parameter values in NK models and < 1 this condition is met. That is, there are in…nity of stable paths -the 'non-uniqueness'problem (Taylor, 1977) . that all the paths are feasible. The …rst question is: is the threat in statement 1) credible?
People know that hyperin ‡ation (hyperde ‡ation) is costly for the central bank/government too. If we think of in ‡ation as a tax chosen by the government on optimising grounds then plainly the government will be thrown away from its optimum, obtaining excessive (inadequate) revenue etc. Thus if the central bank carries out this threat, the government's and society's interests would be badly damaged too. So people would conclude that the central bank would simply not follow up on its threat in society's best interests. That is, they would expect the central bank to accommodate rising in ‡ation ( < 1). So clearly the implicit threat in NK models (the 'Taylor Principle') is simply not credible in equilibrium.
The second question is: assume the threat is credible; then if it were to be carried out is there anything to stop the unstable path continuing to in…nity? One possible way that the path could be stopped is by violating real variable transversality conditions. In the New Keynesian model this is not the case, as noted by Cochrane. In models with a demand for real balances, McCallum (2008) notes that again transversality conditions on real money demand cannot rule out hyperin ‡ations for reasonable preferences; Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1983) reached the same conclusion when money enters the utility function, suggesting that the government could rule out hyperin ‡ation by backing the currency at some fractional value. This is a policy suggestion, which acts in a similar way to our suggestion below, as we will explain.
Thus we …nd that a) the rule implies an incredible threat; and that b) even were it to be credible, it would imply that unstable paths would continue to in…nity were they to occur. Under a) the Taylor Rule defaults to an accommodative rule under which there is indeterminacy of stable paths. Under b) unstable paths would carry on for ever were they to occur. Hence there is nothing to make them infeasible. Thus e¤ectively we have two possible NK models; either one with indeterminacy of stable paths or one with indeterminacy of unstable paths. Notice we are not attacking the NK model as such but we are arguing that it fails to provide a reason for private agents to pick a unique stable path. 8 
Traditional Macro Model and In ‡ation Determinacy
How do we deal with explosive solution paths in traditional macro models of the 1970s?
Our objective here is twofold. We show that the solution of this model is similar to the NK model discussed above. Moreover, we shall show how explosive paths are ruled out in these models. We illustrate this with the aid of the Minford and Peel (2002) 
where m t and p t are the natural logarithms of money supply and the price level, respectively; and m is a monetary target, and E is the rational expectations operator. The …rst equation is a money demand function, specifying that the demand for money responds 8 We may note that McCallum (2008) agrees about the existence of this problem and proposes to rule them out by a 'learnability condition'-which he has also proposed in other contexts as a way of validating his minimum state variable solution methods for RE models. We note this; but while learnability may indeed, we concede, be desirable, we can envisage situations where agents already know the models that exist. In such situations learnability does not arise. Thus a criterion is needed for models to work when they are known. Otherwise we are reduced to saying that such-and-such a model will not work unless it is unknown because then it will work because it will be learnt -a strange proposition. We therefore believe a criterion more fundamental than learnability is needed.
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negatively to expected price level changes. The second equation is a money supply function where the government has a monetary target, m. The above model is an example of RE models involving a future variable, and the main problem in solving the model comes from the presence of E t p t+1 in the …rst equation.
Substituting (3.2) in (3.1) for m t yields;
The solution of this …rst-order non-homogenous di¤erence equation is:
where m is the equilibrium of p t (the 'particular solution'), 1+ is the unstable root and E t p t+1 m is the constant (determined by the initial value E t p t+1 ) in the 'general'solution.
Notice that the general solution for E t p t+1 has the same form as (1.4) above. Equation (3.5) gives an in…nite number of solution paths for E t p t+i+1 (i 0). For we are free to choose any value of E t p t+1 we like; the model does not restrict our choice. Another way of looking at (3.5) is to say that we can choose any future value for E t p t+i+1 we wish and work back from that to a solution for E t p t+1 . Any view of this future will then compel a present which is consistent with it; any set of expectations is therefore self-justifying i.e. anything can happen 14 provided it is expected, but what is expected is arbitrary. Worse still, as (3.5) illustrates, these paths for events can be unstable; in fact, our model here implies that all paths for prices except that for which E t p t+1 = m, explode monotonically. Thus the model would assert that only by accident would an equilibrium price level be established, otherwise prices would be propelled into either ever-deepening hyperde ‡ation or ever-accelerating hyperin ‡ation, even though money supply is held rigid! To prevent these unstable paths, we appeal to an optimising government, choosing the in ‡ation tax. Having chosen its optimum target --which here for simplicity we set at zero -we assume it sets a money supply target designed to achieve it, provided unstable paths do not occur. It then needs, in order to achieve this optimum, to prevent these unstable paths from occurring. It turns out that a commitment on its part to put an end to any in ‡ation (de ‡ation) bubble paths at some point, by decreasing (increasing) the money supply su¢ ciently to force prices o¤ this path, will do the trick. For if people expect that in ‡ation will stop at some period t + N (at which the bank will 'step in'), then desired real money balances in t + N will now be higher and in ‡ation would fall at t + N . If in ‡ation falls in t + N then people would postpone consumption at t + N 1 and in ‡ation would fall at t + N 1 too. And so on. By backward induction the whole process gets invalidated. We can show this formally by imposing the terminal condition
Substituting the terminal condition in (3.4) yields
This implies from (3.5)
Finally, from (3.3) we have
An analogous argument can be constructed for the frictionless NK model discussed above.
If in ‡ation takes o¤ along an explosive path what is there to stop it? Suppose the central bank commits to put an end to this path at some point by reducing money growth and if the commitment is credible, then the whole process gets invalidated. To see this let us impose the terminal condition, E t t+i+1 = E t t+i , (for i N ), on our frictionless NK model. Substituting the terminal condition in (1.3) yields E t t+N +1 = ? : Thus, we have t = E t t+1 = ? . We have ruled out unstable paths by appealing to a terminal condition on in ‡ation implemented via the money supply (or money growth) rule. Is this terminal condition credible? As we have argued, the government has an incentive to prevent an unstable path because it is the stable path that maximises its objectives. There is a lot at stake here for it and people understand this. Therefore a commitment to stop these bubble paths is credible. This implies that money cannot be avoided in NK models, contrary to the 'cashless world'invoked by Woodford et al. 9 It can be seen that this government commitment acts to disrupt unstable paths in just the same way that Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1983)'s suggestion for government fractional backing of the currency prevents hyperin ‡ation paths (while a transversality condition on real balances not tending to in…nity because they would be swapped for consumption goods rules out hyperde ‡ation). Our suggestion can be thus thought of as a practical way of implementing the same idea.
Finally, we should note that the terminal condition acts like a special sort of monetary rule in which a variable (money) is used to implement a target for another variable (prices)
by taking whatever value is necessary. Examples of such rules are …xed exchange rates in which reserves (thus money) are varied as much as necessary to hit an exchange rate target; or …xed interest rate rules in which money is varied as much as necessary to hit an interest rate target. Formally, two variables swap exogenous for endogenous status within an N-equation model; thus under …xed exchange rates, reserves become endogenous while the exchange rate is exogenised, whereas under ‡oating exchange rates, reserves are exogenised and the exchange rate becomes endogenous. Under the terminal condition, money swaps its exogenous status (with prices endogenous) for endogenous status (with prices exogenous).
Conclusion
The New Keynesian model of in ‡ation determination has no e¤ective mechanism for ruling out explosive bubbles. It fails to provide a reason for private agents to pick a unique stable path. We propose a way forward. Our proposal is in e¤ect that the NK model should be formulated with a money demand and money supply function, as above in the 'traditional' model; as there too, it should embody a terminal condition on in ‡ation. This is implemented by an override on the money supply rule explicitly designed to stop bubble paths at some point should they occur. To replicate the Taylor Rule we simply specify the money supply rule to imply the Taylor Rule being followed; thus the Taylor 
